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 1 
WATER ALLOCATION COMPACTS IN THE WEST:  AN OVERVIEW 
 






In the American West, questions of allocation typically dominate interstate water 
disputes.  There are two common approaches for resolving these conflicts.2  First, as the 
holder of “original jurisdiction” in disputes among states, the U.S. Supreme Court is 
empowered to resolve interstate complaints.  Traditionally, this has been done using the 
highly flexible doctrine of “equitable apportionment” in which considerations of equity 
and need are used to craft allocations that can be later revisited by the Court should 
conditions change.  The initial use of equitable apportionment was on the Arkansas River 
between Colorado and Kansas in 1907, although the most celebrated case in 1931 
concerned the Delaware River.3 
 
 The second and much more common approach for resolving interstate conflicts in 
the West has been the use of interstate compacts (McCormick, 1994).  Compacts are 
legally binding agreements between states, as authorized by the compact clause of the 
Constitution.  States generally prefer compacts over equitable apportionment proceedings 
since they can retain control over the dispute resolution process, the terms of the ultimate 
agreement, and the implementation arrangements.  Compacts also allow allocations to 
occur long before needs materialize, which can greatly aid long-term planning and 
management programs.  For these and other reasons, even the courts typically encourage 
compacts over judicial proceedings.4 
 
 Twenty-two interstate compacts containing a specific water allocation formula 
can be found west of the Mississippi River.5  They are listed below: 
 
1. Arkansas River Compact of 1948 
2. Arkansas River Compact of 1965 
3. Arkansas River Compact of 1970 
                                               
1 Research Associate, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law.  Contact the 
author at: Natural Resources Law Center, UCB 401, Boulder, CO, 80309-0401, (303) 492-1296, 
Douglas.Kenney@colorado.edu.  
2 Arguably, a third strategy also exists, but it is far from common: congressional apportionment.  This 
approach is not included here because it has only been observed in one, highly unusual situation, and is 
generally not expected to emerge again as a means for interstate apportionment.  The case in question 
involved allocation of the Lower Colorado River among Arizona, California, and Nevada, something that 
Congress effectively did (according to a later court decision) in the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 
(Getches, 1990). 
3 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).     
4 For example, see: Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, at 392 (1943). 
5 This list is believed to be complete.  Note that other compacts mention the subject of allocation (i.e., 
apportionment), but are omitted here if they do not provide a specific (quantified) allocation formula. 
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4. Bear River Compact of 1978 (originally 1955) 
5. Belle Fourche River Compact of 1943 
6. Big Blue River Compact of 1971 
7. Caddo Lake Compact of 1979 
8. Canadian River Compact of 1950 
9. Colorado River Compact of 1922 
10. Costilla Creek Compact of 1963 (originally 1944) 
11. Klamath River Compact of 1957 
12. La Plata River Compact of 1922 
13. Pecos River Compact of 1948 
14. Red River Compact of 1978 
15. Republican River Compact of 1942 
16. Rio Grande Compact of 1938 
17. Sabine River Compact of 1953 
18. Snake River Compact of 1949 
19. South Platte River Compact of 1923 
20. Upper Colorado River Compact of 1948 
21. Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962 
22. Yellowstone River Compact of 1950 
 
Interstate water allocation compacts are also becoming fashionable in the East, as 
found in the Delaware, Susquehanna, Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF), and 
Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) River Basins.  The Delaware and Susquehanna 
compacts are unique in that they involve the federal government as a signatory and 
partner (so-called federal-interstate compacts) (GAO, 1981).  The agreements in the 
ACT/ACF basins are unique in that they do not include allocation formulas, but rather 
establish commissions empowered to later devise allocation compacts—an ongoing 
exercise.   
  
Typically, the negotiation and approval of interstate compacts has followed a 5-
step process: (1) Congress authorizes the states to negotiate a compact, (2) state 
legislatures appoint commissioners, (3) the commissioners meet, usually aided by a 
federal chairman, to negotiate and sign the agreement, (4) the state legislatures ratify the 
compact, and (5) Congress ratifies the compact.  Omitted from this description is the 
common role of federal water development in stimulating agreements, as the Department 
of the Interior typically required states to resolve interstate water allocation disputes prior 
to commencing federally funded river basin developments.  The best example of this 
phenomenon occurred in the Upper Colorado River Basin, where a Bureau of 
Reclamation study identifying 134 potential projects prompted the basin states within 







 The key element in interstate water allocation compacts is the mathematical 
formula used to apportion flows.  The treatment of two related variables best explains the 
different approaches seen in allocation formulas: (1) the type of hydrologic standards 
used, and (2) the time scale over which the hydrologic variables are measured: 
 
§ Hydrologic Standards:  Four general approaches can be identified pertaining 
to the type of hydrologic standards used: (1) systems based on maintaining 
minimum flow levels at state lines (or other useful gauging stations), (2) 
approaches based on reservoir storage, (3) formulas allocating fixed or 
percentage-based rights to consumption or diversion, and (4) a requirement 
for upstream states to deliver downstream a minimum volume (rather than a 
constant flow rate) over a lengthy time period.   
 
§ Time Scale:  Four general approaches can be identified pertaining to the time 
scales employed in operation of the allocation formula: (1) constant 
requirements (same standard in effect at all times); (2) seasonal requirements, 
(3) annual requirements (i.e., typically a “water year” standard); and (4) a 
multi-year requirement. 
 
Another parameter occasionally of concern is the type of information required as 
inputs for formula operation, in part because this has great implications for administrative 
arrangements.  Some approaches require daily measurements or calculations; others only 
require this information periodically or under special circumstances; while others—such 
as those limiting the construction of storage capacity—do have require any field 
monitoring.  As a practical matter, information needs are primarily a function of the 
hydrologic standards and time scales employed. 
 
 Table 1 provides a summary of the approaches used in the 22 compacts studied.  






 Administering compact allocations and resolving conflicts are duties frequently 
delegated to compact commissions formed by the interstate agreements.  Eighteen of the 
22 compacts either establish, or provide for the establishment of, a compact commission.  
When a commission is established, a key decision is whether or not a federal member 
should be included, and if so, whether that member should have full voting rights in the 
decision making of the body.  Fourteen of the 22 compacts studied have a federal 
member, but only in one case—the Upper Colorado River Commission—does that 




PROBLEMS WITH INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
 
 Several compacts have been highly problematic.  Examples include those for the 
La Plata, Pecos, Canadian, Arkansas, Rio Grande, and Colorado Rivers.  Problems 
usually stem from noncompliance with compact terms, incorrect assumptions about 
precipitation and runoff levels, the omission of key factors in the apportionment formula 
(e.g., the failure to consider surface water/groundwater connections), and growth of water 
demands in some areas beyond compact apportionments (Kenney, 1996).  Most of these 
problems can be avoided in new compacts by basing apportionments on percentages 
(rather than absolute values), utilizing good scientific data, providing a strong 
Commission and related means of administration and dispute resolution, and by 
broadening the scope of the agreement somewhat to include related topics influencing, 





A growing concern in many of the western water allocation compacts is their 
narrow focus, which is problematic given the salient impact of water allocation on other 
facets of water management.  For this reason, these compacts are often felt to have 
serious substantive omissions.  One of the easiest ways to document these omissions is to 
search the text of the agreement for key terms.  Some of the more potentially serious 
omissions are discussed below, and summarized in Table 3. 
 
 
GROUNDWATER (search terms: groundwater, ground water, aquifer) 
 
 A failure to consider the groundwater/surface water connection is at the heart of 
many problematic compacts.  Any reference to groundwater occurs in only three of the 
22 compacts studied: the Bear River Compact (1955, 1978), the Klamath River Compact 
of 1957, and the Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962.  More often than not, these few 
references sidestep the issue of groundwater/surface water connections, defining some 
groundwater as outside the scope of the agreement, and postponing any action on 
groundwater to a future negotiation following technical studies: 
 
§ In two instances, the Bear River Compact (1955, 1978) mentions 
groundwater: once to clarify that tributary groundwater is part of a specific 
apportionment rule, and once to mention that both surface water and 
groundwater used for small-scale domestic and stock watering purposes are 
outside the scope of the compact apportionment. 
 
§ The Klamath River Compact of 1957 essentially defines groundwater as 
outside the scope of the agreement, which is confined to water “appearing on 
the surface of the ground in streams, lakes or otherwise, regardless of whether 
such waters at any time were or will become ground water, but shall not 
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include water extracted from underground sources until after such water is 
used and becomes surface return flow or waste water” (emphasis added). 
 
§ The Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962 apportions surface water, but 
recognizes a desire to later apportion groundwater pending further study.  
Specifically, the states of “Nebraska and Wyoming recognize that the future 
use of ground water for irrigation in the Niobrara River basin may be a factor 
in the depletion of the surface flows of the Niobrara River, and since the data 
now available are inadequate to make a determination in regard to this matter, 
any apportionment of the ground water of the Niobrara River basin should be 




NATIVE AMERICAN WATER INTERESTS (search terms: Indian, tribe, tribal, Native 
American, indigenous) 
 
Nine compacts make at least a reference to Native American interests in the 
waters apportioned: the Bear River Compact of 1955 (and 1978), the Canadian River 
Compact of 1950, the Colorado River Compact of 1922, the Klamath River Compact of 
1957, the Rio Grande Compact of 1938, the Snake River Compact of 1949, the Upper 
Colorado River Compact of 1948, the Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962, and the 
Yellowstone River Compact of 1950.6  In each case, however, no meaningful effort is 
made to quantify or include tribal water rights into the apportionment. 
 
 Regarding Indian water rights, the compacts use remarkably similar, 
“boilerplate,” language.  The language of the Colorado River Compact of 1922 
established the standard that the others closely follow: “Nothing in this compact shall be 
construed as affecting the obligations of the United States of America to Indian tribes.”  
By identifying tribal water rights as a federal obligation, the apportionment among the 
states is, presumably, unaffected.  The Snake River Compact of 1949, however, 
recognizes an important but normally unspoken caveat of the apportionment that is likely 
true in the other compacts: “The water required to satisfy these rights shall be charged 
against the allocation made to the state in which the Indians and their lands are located.”   
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (search terms: environment, environmental) 
 
The term “environment” or “environmental” shows up in two of the 22 compacts: 
the Red River Compact of 1978, and the Caddo Lake Compact of 1979.  However, since 
the Caddo Lake Compact is a further refinement of the apportionment already described 
in the Red River Compact, these two references could arguably be viewed as one.  (Note 
that these are two of the three youngest of the 22 compacts.) 
 
                                               
6 The phrase “reserved rights” does not appear in any of the 22 compacts. 
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 The Caddo Lake Compact articulates a desire to “preserve and protect Caddo 
Lake as a valuable environmental, cultural and natural resource and enhance water 
resource and recreational potentials, while allowing its utilization for water needs of 
adjacent portions of Louisiana and Texas” (emphasis added).  (It also contains a stray 
reference to the National Environmental Policy Act.)  The Red River Compact, 
meanwhile, contains references to the problem of water pollution, and its potential to 
result in “adverse social, economic, and environmental impacts” (emphasis added). 
 
 
FISH AND WILDLIFE (search terms: fish, fishery, fisheries, wildlife, wildfowl) 
 
 References to fish and/or wildlife occur in only four of the 22 compacts: the Big 
Blue River Compact of 1971, the Klamath River Compact of 1957, the Red River 
Compact of 1978, and the Snake River Compact of 1949. 
 
§ The Big Blue Compact apportions water supply storage limits that are exclusive 
of storage needed for “improvement of water quality, for fishery, wildlife, or 
recreation purposes” (emphasis added).   
 
§ The scope of the Klamath Compact includes the “use of water for domestic 
purposes; the development of lands by irrigation and other means; the protection 
and enhancement of fish, wildlife and recreational resources; the use of water for 
industrial purposes and hydroelectric power production; and the use and control 
of water for navigation and flood prevention” (emphasis added).  To the extent 
that insufficient water is available to satisfy all uses, the compact further states 
that fish and wildlife issues will be given priority over industrial and hydroelectric 
uses, but will be junior to domestic uses and irrigation.  
 
§ The Red River Compact mentions adverse impacts to “fish and other aquatic life” 
as one example of pollution. 
 
§ The Snake River Compact identifies certain types of reservoirs where releases—
not to exceed 5 cubic feet/second—are required, as necessary, to maintain fish 
and wildlife and for stock water use. 
 
In no case is the protection of fish and wildlife a serious area of focus, and only in 
the Klamath Compact are fish and wildlife issues mentioned several times.  
“Biodiversity” is never mentioned in the 22 compacts. 
 
 
 WATER QUALITY  (search terms: water quality, pollution) 
 
The 22 western compacts selected for study are those featuring water allocation 
formulas.  Some compacts lacking allocation formulas but dealing with pollution exist, 
but are generally found in the eastern United States.  Of the 22 western compacts, 6 (of 
the mostly younger compacts) mention water quality and/or pollution: the Arkansas River 
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Compact of 1965, the Arkansas River Compact of 1970, the Big Blue River Compact of 
1971, the Caddo Lake Compact of 1979, the Klamath River Compact of 1957, and the 
Red River Compact of 1978. 
 
 Most of these compacts are similar in structure (and language) regarding 
pollution, identifying deteriorating water quality as a problem of mutual concern, and 
committing to an active pollution-abatement program.  The relevant commissions are 
instructed to collect information, promote coordination among existing pollution control 
organizations, and in rare occasions, to take regulatory action.  For example, the Klamath 
Commission, is empowered, when necessary, to issue binding and legally enforceable 
pollution control regulations.  Similarly, under very specific and limited conditions, the 
Red River Commission can litigate to ensure full compliance with existing regulations. 
 
 
DROUGHTS AND RELATED EMERGENCIES (search terms: climate, drought) 
 
 Few compacts make specific references to drought conditions, perhaps because 
well-designed allocation formulas anticipate shortages.  Nonetheless, it is odd that only 
one of the 22 compacts studied mentions the term “drought.”7  That reference occurs in 
the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948, which merely empowers the 
Commission to “Make findings of fact in the event of the occurrence of extraordinary 
drought or serious accident to the irrigation system in the upper basin…”  
 
 The issue of drought management is more explicitly addressed in two of the three 
compacts that feature the term “emergency.”  The Caddo Lake Compact of 1979 
empowers the Commission to authorize diversions during an emergency or other 
catastrophic event, “such as destruction of a municipality or political subdivision's other 
water supply source or a drawdown which is more severe than the critical drawdown of 
record.”  A much more precise strategy is outlined in the Bear River Compact of 1978, 
which provides a specific apportionment schedule for times of water emergency, defined 
in terms of flows below a given theshold.  The other compact mentioning emergencies, 
the Klamath River Compact of 1957, is simply in reference to a temporary waiving of the 
public hearing requirement as part of rulemaking. 
 
 In contrast, note that floods are mentioned in 8 compacts, and mentioned 
repeatedly in two compacts: the Pecos River Compact of 1948, and the Red River 
Compact of 1978.  These references are necessary to account for excess flows that can be 
subject to further apportionment.   
 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS WITH COMPACTS 
 
 These “omissions” can hinder the utility of compacts as the basis for interstate 
water management.  In addition to the problems associated with the substantive 
omissions, compacts can raise other concerns and problems—e.g.: 
                                               
7 None of the compacts mentions the word “climate.” 
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§ While water allocation compacts often provide an element of certainty, stability, and 
civility in interstate water issues, this certainty can be somewhat counterproductive, 
in that it can eliminate the need and opportunity for continued interaction among the 
basin states.  With the very limited exception of periodic meetings of compact 
commissioners, so-called “successful” compacts generally do not require interstate 
coordination or ongoing cooperation, and provide little reason for one state to be 
concerned with the water needs of the other.    
 
§ Similarly, the stability offered by a compact apportionment can, in certain 
circumstances, be viewed as inflexibility.  Unlike an equitable apportionment, 
compacts cannot be modified unilaterally except, perhaps, by congressional action—
and no congress has demonstrated an interest in testing that power.  Additionally, 
unlike intrastate water rights administered under a prior appropriation scheme, 
compact water rights are generally not believed to be marketable at the interstate 
scale.  No western compact mentions interstate marketing.  While this “omission” is 
generally viewed as desirable by the signatory states, it is nonetheless a source of 
inflexibility in water systems that are generally acknowledged to need greater 
flexibility.  For these and related reasons, compacts should only be considered as 
useful tools for allocation, not reallocation. 
 
§ Compacts also do not usually reconcile hydrologic and political regions.  While the 
signatories to a compact may collectively encompass the entire drainage basin of a 
particular river, the boundaries of those states do not follow the actual contours of the 
river basin.  Consequently, within states, issues arise about whether to use compact 
apportionments within the basin itself, or in areas outside the basin.  Many of the 
largest users of the Colorado River, for example, lie outside the topographic bounds 
of the river basin (e.g., Los Angeles), but are within the states recognized in the 





CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Water allocation compacts in the West have been effectively used to resolve (and 
preempt) dozens of interstate water conflicts.  This is a significant accomplishment, and 
suggests an ongoing need for compacting processes.  Yet, it is important to realize the 
limitations of the compact approach.  Many compacts are problematic in various ways, 
and few offer any basis for truly integrated management at the basin scale.  In part, this is 
a reflection of the circumstances and era in which most of the compacts were negotiated: 
most were enacted to clear the way for dam-building projects, and only 2 of the 
compacts, for example, were enacted (in their original version) after passage of the Clean 
Water Act in 1972.  Compacts aggressively addressing issues such as water quality 
                                               
8 There are exceptions.  The Klamath River Compact, for example, explicitly provides priority to users of 
Klamath River water in California that reside within the drainage basin. 
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management, flood control and planning, and project integration are relatively common, 
but are generally confined to the Midwest and East, and are generally distinct from the 
western agreements focused on allocation (Muys, 1971).  Similarly, only in the East do 
you see the federal-interstate compacts (that include the federal government as a 
signatory and equal partner), and in no circumstance do you see a significant effort to 
include tribal interests in these regional agreements.  And compact commissions, where 
they exist, are usually very modest organizations with very narrow functions and 
authorities.  Thus, while there is no reason why water allocation compacts cannot be a 
stepping-stone to more integrated and sophisticated regional water management, that is 
simply not what has happened in practice.  If additional compacts are to be crafted in the 
future, it would be reasonable to demand a little more ambition from the negotiators.   
 
Despite these concerns about the limited scope of most compacts, the fact remains 
that the success of future water allocation compacts is still primarily tied to the quality of 
the allocation formulas crafted.  A good formula is normally one based on accurate and 
complete information, easily measured hydrologic parameters, and that anticipates all 
relevant complicating factors—such as the surface/ground-water connection.  The design 
should reflect the physical and institutional features in the basin, including the 
infrastructure of water projects and gauges, the availability of information (and technical 
understanding), the water needs of the residents, and the current and emerging water 
management challenges. 
 
Prior to enactment, draft formulas should be evaluated with respect to the 
following questions (Kenney, 1996): 
 
§ Could special situations arise in which the allocation formula is simply not 
functional, or confusion exists in the apportionment of limited (or excessive) 
flows? 
 
§ Will the Commission (or other administrative body) be expected to make 
decisions based on incomplete or poor information, or be expected to 
frequently make “judgment calls”?   
 
§ Could one of the following factors or events disrupt the functioning of the 
allocation formula: 
o changes to the physical system through natural processes; 
o new water developments or uses; 
o situations in which water quality influences water supply; 
o natural depletions, including environmental needs; 
o interbasin transfers; 
o exercise or redefinition of tribal water rights or federal reserved rights; 
o extreme events (droughts and floods) and long-term climatic change; 
o surface water/groundwater interactions. 
 




§ Will the Commission (or similar body) lack adequate access to resources, 
expertise and authority? 
 
§ Does the agreement lack a dispute resolution mechanism? 
 
§ Does the agreement violate norms of fairness and political expertise? 
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Arkansas CO, KS 1948  X    X   
Arkansas KS, OK 1965  X   X    
Arkansas AR, OK 1970   X    X  
Bear ID, UT, WY 1955, 
1978 
 X X  X    
Belle 
Fourche 
WY, SD 1943   X  X    
Big Blue NE, KS 1971 X X   X X   
Caddo Lake LA, TX 1979   X   X   
Canadian NM, TX, OK 1950  X   X    
Colorado WY, CO, UT, 
NM, NW, AZ, 
CA 
1922    X    X 
Costilla 
Creek 
CO, NM 1944, 
1963 
  X   X   
Klamath OR, CA 1957   X  X    
La Plata CO, NM 1922 X    X X   
Pecos  NM, TX 1948 X  X     X 
Red  TX, OK, AR, LA 1978   X    X  
Republican CO, NE, KS 1942   X    X  
Rio Grande CO, NM, TX 1938    X   X  
Sabine TX, LA 1953 X  X  X  X  
Snake WY, ID 1949   X    X  
South Platte CO, NE 1923 X    X X   
Upper 
Colorado 
WY, CO, UT, 
NM 
1948   X    X  
Upper 
Niobrara 
WY, NE 1962  X     X  





TABLE 2.  WATER ALLOCATION COMPACTS IN THE WEST:  ADMINISTRATIVE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Compact Commission Exists Federal Member 
 
Basin States Year Yes No Yes No 
Arkansas CO, KS 1948 X  X  
Arkansas KS, OK 1965 X  X  
Arkansas AR, OK 1970 X  X  
Bear ID, UT, WY 1955, 
1978 
X  X  
Belle 
Fourche 
WY, SD 1943  X  No commission 
Big Blue NE, KS 1971 X  X  
Caddo Lake LA, TX 1979 X   X 
Canadian NM, TX, OK 1950 X  X  
Colorado WY, CO, UT, 
NM, NW, AZ, 
CA 
1922  X  No commission 
Costilla 
Creek 
CO, NM 1944, 
1963 
X   X 
Klamath OR, CA 1957 X  X  
La Plata CO, NM 1922 X   X 
Pecos  NM, TX 1948 X  X  
Red TX, OK, AR, LA 1978 X  X  
Republican CO, NE, KS 1942 X  X  
Rio Grande CO, NM, TX 1938 X  X  
Sabine TX, LA 1953 X  X  
Snake WY, ID 1949  X  No commission 
South Platte CO, NE 1923 X   X 
Upper 
Colorado 
WY, CO, UT, 
NM 
1948 X  X  
Upper 
Niobrara 
WY, NE 1962  X  No commission 






















Arkansas CO, KS 1948       
Arkansas KS, OK 1965     X  
Arkansas AR, OK 1970     X  
Bear ID, UT, WY 1955, 
1978 
X X     
Belle 
Fourche 
WY, SD 1943       
Big Blue NE, KS 1971    X X  
Caddo Lake LA, TX 1979   X  X  
Canadian NM, TX, OK 1950  X     
Colorado WY, CO, UT, 
NM, NW, AZ, 
CA 
1922  X     
Costilla 
Creek 
CO, NM 1944, 
1963 
      
Klamath OR, CA 1957 X X  X X  
La Plata CO, NM 1922       
Pecos  NM, TX 1948       
Red  TX, OK, AR, LA 1978   X X X  
Republican CO, NE, KS 1942       
Rio Grande CO, NM, TX 1938  X     
Sabine TX, LA 1953       
Snake WY, ID 1949  X  X   
South Platte CO, NE 1923       
Upper 
Colorado 
WY, CO, UT, 
NM 
1948  X    X 
Upper 
Niobrara 
WY, NE 1962 X X     
Yellowstone WY, MT, ND 1950  X     
 
 
 
 
